Launch on warning is a nuclear strategy that gained recognition during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the invention of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), launch on warning became an integral part of mutually assured destruction (MAD) theory. When the first warning of a nuclear launch is received, the other side immediately launches their missiles, before their own launch sites are attrited or destroyed.
History
Prior to the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the Strategic Air Command, and probably its Soviet counterpart, had multiple bombers on patrol at all times. In the event of a nuclear strike by one of the nations, the other nation would order their bombers to fly to the other country and drop their nuclear payload on predetermined targets. In the United States, these bombers were typically either B-47 Stratojets or B-52 Stratofortresses, and there were three major flight routes. With bombers already in the air, there was an assurance that a retaliatory strike would be feasible, even if the country that was attacked could do very little otherwise. At the height of the Cold War, the United States had special Boeing EC-135 "Looking Glass" aircraft equipped as control centers for the nuclear arsenal. The battle staff included a general or flag officer who was authorized to order a retaliatory strike in the event that the President could not be contacted.
Launch on warning has its roots in U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower's "Positive Control" strategy, but really took shape with the introduction of the Minuteman missile. Since many ICBMs (including the Minuteman) were launched from underground silos, the concern arose that a first strike by one nation could destroy the ground launch facilities of the retaliating nation.
MIRVed land-based ICBMs are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium on striking first. If, for example, each side has 100 missiles, with 5 warheads each, and further each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralizing the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing 2 warheads at each silo, the side that strikes first can reduce the enemy ICBM force from 100 missiles to about 5 by firing 40 missiles with 200 warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles in reserve. It is because of this that this type of weapon was banned under the negotiated START II agreement between the US and Russia in 1993. However, this agreement was never ratified by either party, and in fact Russia withdrew from it in 2002 when the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Hence, Russia (but not the US) still possesses ICBM-launched MIRV's as of 2009.
Launch on warning
The introduction of nuclear-tipped ICBMs required new strategies because, unlike bombers, ICBMs cannot be recalled after launch. There were two primary options. One option, "retaliation after ride-out," would require the second-strike nation to wait until after they were attacked to launch their missiles. Some portion of the nuclear arsenal would inevitably be destroyed in such an attack. This led to both superpowers investing heavily in survivable basing modes for their nuclear forces, including hardened underground missile silos for ICBMs, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The other choice was "launch on warning" - launching nuclear missiles before the other side's missiles could destroy them. With the invention of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System in the early 1960s, the possibility of America detecting launches of Soviet missiles became real. In the 1970s, this technology came to fruition after the deployment of space-based launch detection technology on both sides.
Once both countries had the ability to detect ballistic missile launches, both countries could at least theoretically implement a "launch on warning" strategy. It is a popular belief that either or both superpowers actually adopted this as a standing policy. Neither country has publicly confirmed or denied that they had a launch on warning policy in effect.
Implementing a practical launch on warning policy would be very difficult. A false alarm would have catastrophic effects once the missiles were launched without a means to recall them. Moreover, the country under attack may not have enough time to make a considered decision on whether or not to retaliate.
The leadership of a country under attack by ICBMs would probably have at most thirty minutes—the time it takes an ICBM to reach its target—to make a launch decision. In reality, many factors would reduce the amount of time available.
The nation that strikes first may elect to use a technique called X-ray pin-down to delay a retaliatory response. This technique involves a barrage of submarine-based missiles fired from close range in a "depressed trajectory" mode that reaches its targets in minutes. The warheads would be set to explode every minute or so at high altitudes over the ICBM fields of the targeted country because missiles launched on a depressed trajectory cannot achieve the level of accuracy necessary to hit the enemy missile silos directly. The resulting nuclear pulse makes it difficult, if not impossible, to launch retaliatory ICBMs without damaging their navigation systems for the duration of the high-altitude detonations. During this delay, the attacking country could launch a salvo of first-strike ICBMs on regular trajectories to target the ICBM missile silos that have been pinned down. This greatly shortens the effective warning time the leader of the attacked country has to make his decision regarding a retaliatory strike after being notified of an attack. It takes a few minutes to confirm launch detection from early warning systems, and another few minutes for ICBMs to complete their launch procedures, and then a bit more for them to clear the region of X-ray pin-down, and that squeezes the decision time from both ends of the schedule.
Alternatively (or additionally), submarines could launch a depressed-trajectory strike against the capital of the targeted country, in an effort to destroy its command structure before any retaliatory decision could be made. This is known as a decapitation strike.
For these reasons, launch on warning was regarded as an extremely dangerous policy. Consequently, both superpowers deployed their nuclear forces in survivable basing modes to maintain a credible deterrent of residual retaliatory forces that would survive a first strike. This gives military leaders the more realistic option of riding out the attack, assessing which forces remain operational, and deciding what range of retaliatory options are available; which in turn, makes the success of a first strike less certain, and thus reduces the incentive to launch one.
There are nuclear strategies that fall short of massive retaliation. One of these is the proportional response. If one country launches one missile, accidentally or otherwise, a proportional response of one missile may be chosen. It's impossible to know for sure what the outcome would have been had one of the superpowers launched a small number of ICBMs at the other, but it's possible that such an event might not have led to all-out nuclear war.
The strategy of launch on warning is largely an academic one today, due to the deployment of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Both the United States and Russia operate a fleet of submarines carrying nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. The purpose of these submarines is to hide in the vastness of the ocean until needed, and then launch their missiles. They allow either country the ability to launch a second-strike, regardless of what is happening at home. Similarly, all of the strategic nuclear weapons currently deployed by the United Kingdom and France are submarine-based (although France still has around 50 nuclear-tipped air launched cruise missiles).
However, the potential destruction of US GPS satellites in the event of a nuclear war, using high altitude nuclear detonations to create a destructive electromagnetic pulse, would make nuclear submarines much less accurate. They would then be unable to be used for counterforce purposes that require high accuracy to destroy hardened targets. Although the SLBMs would still be able to produce a countervalue second-strike, this may still allow the first-strike nation to possess further land or airbase-based weapons after this second-strike and emerge with enough of a nuclear force, despite a devastated populace, to impose its will against its opponent and presumably much of rest of the world. See the 1983 novel Warday for a hypothetical account of this possibility as a problem in MAD.
Game theory
The principle behind "launch on warning" is an element of game theory and has been studied extensively by game theorists. The nuclear arms race would best be described as a non-zero-sum game. As long as neither side launches, both countries survive. If one country launches a first strike, the other country launches a retaliatory strike (second strike), and both sides lose. The only way for either side to win is for neither side to launch a first strike. This is also known as nuclear deterrence.
The MAD doctrine between the Soviet Union and the United States throughout the Cold War represents a Nash equilibrium, where neither side is willing to escalate the confrontation due to fear of all-out nuclear war. Anti-ballistic missile systems have been criticized by some as having the potential to upset this balance of power. If one nation develops technology capable of destroying incoming missiles, that country then has the ability to launch a first-strike without having to endure a retaliator
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